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Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation ?

By Joëlle Proust

Abstract

Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need not involve metarepresentation, nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind

Topics: metacognition, metarepresentation, procedural reflexivity, [SHS.PHIL.EPISTEMO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/domain_shs.phil.epistemo, [SHS.PHIL.MIND] Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/domain_shs.phil.mind, [SHS.PHIL.ACTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/domain_shs.phil.action, [SCCO.COGDYNAMICS] Cognitive science/domain_scco.cogdynamics, [SCCO.ETHOLOGY] Cognitive science/domain_scco.ethology
Publisher: HAL CCSD
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:HAL:ijn_00139315v1

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