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Bundling without price discrimination\ud

By Andrés M. Carvajal, Marzena Rostek and Marek Weretka

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopoly in markets in which a seller cannot monitor and thereby restrict the purchases of buyers to a single bundle, while buyers have resale opportunities. In such markets, the standard mechanism through which bundling increases seller profits, based on price discrimination, is not feasible. The profit-maximizing bundling strategy is characterized, given the restrictions on pricing policies resulting from resale and a lack of monitoring. The welfare implications of optimal bundling are analyzed. \ud \u

Topics: HF
Publisher: University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:3522

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Citations

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