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Clausewitz on Auctions

By Samuel H\ue4fner

Abstract

A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two opposing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized con\ufb02icts, yields new theoretical justi\ufb01cation for existing empirical \ufb01ndings with respect to war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battle\ufb01eld behavior

Topics: D74, F51, H56, ddc:330, Auction, War, Multi-Stage Contest, Tug-of War, Tullock Contest Success Function, Microfoundation, Krieg, Rationalit\ue4t, Auktionstheorie, Theorie
Publisher: Basel: University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Year: 2012
OAI identifier: oai:econstor.eu:10419/123437
Provided by: EconStor

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