Location of Repository

From market to non-market: an autonomous agent approach to central planning

By Dan Greenwood


In the longstanding debate in political economy about the feasibility of socialism, the Austrian School of Economists have argued that markets are an indispensable means of evaluating goods, hence a prerequisite for productive efficiency. Socialist models for non-market economic calculation have been strongly influenced by the equilibrium model of neoclassical economics. The Austrians contend that these models overlook the essence of the calculation problem by assuming the availability of knowledge that can be acquired only through the market process itself. But the debate in political economy has not yet considered the recent emergence of agent-based systems and their applications to resource allocation problems. Agent-based simulations of market exchange offer a promising approach to fulfilling the dynamic functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery that the Austrians show to be performed by markets. Further research is needed in order to develop an agent-based approach to the calculation problem, as it is formulated by the Austrians. Given that the macro-level objectives of agent-based systems can be easily engineered, they could even become a desirable alternative to the real markets that the Austrians favour

Topics: UOW10
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk:4623
Provided by: WestminsterResearch

Suggested articles



  1. 1988a Comparative ecology: a computational perspective.
  2. (2003). Agent Technology: Enabling Next Generation Computing Agent Technology: A Roadmap for Agent Based Computing. Southampton: AgentLinkII—the European Network of Excellence for Agent-Based Computing.
  3. (2006). Agent-based computational economics: a constructive approach to economic theory,
  4. (2001). An autonomous agent approach to central planning 11
  5. (1990). Application of artificial intelligence techniques to economic planning.
  6. (2003). ARMS collaborator—intelligent agents using markets to organise resourcing in modern enterprises.
  7. (1993). Behaviour of trading automata in a computerized double auction market.
  8. (2002). Co-evolutionary auction mechanism design: a preliminary report.
  9. (1990). Computation, Incentives, and discovery: the cognitive function of markets in market socialism.
  10. (1983). Did the theory of market socialism answer the challenge of Ludwig von Mises?
  11. (1935). Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth.
  12. (1980). Economic calculation under socialism: the austrian contribution.
  13. (1995). Economics.
  14. (2002). Evolutionary optimisation of market-based control systems for resource allocation in compute farms,
  15. (1999). Exploiting a common property resource under a fairness contraint: a case study.
  16. (1992). From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation. La Salle,
  17. (1954). History of Economic Analysis.
  18. (1949). Individualism and Economic Order.
  19. (1966). Input-Output Economics.
  20. (2005). Kurdaitcha Bones—2005. Available from:
  21. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty,
  22. (2001). Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing.
  23. (1996). Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation. London: World Scientific.
  24. (1988). Markets and computation: agoric open systems.
  25. (1933). Price formation in a socialist community.
  26. (1998). Price formation in double auctions.
  27. (1969). Resource Allocation Problems Under Socialism.
  28. (1985). Rivalry and Central Planning. Cambridge:
  29. (1998). Simple bargaining agents for decentralized market-based control,
  30. (2005). Simulation for the Social Scientist,
  31. (2002). Software agents and the route to the information economy.
  32. (1995). Sustainability and Policy. Cambridge:
  33. (1989). The Economic Theory of Central Planning.
  34. (1935). The ministry of production in the collectivist state.
  35. (1990). The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism.
  36. (1993). Towards a New Socialism.
  37. (2004). Welfare engineering in multiagent systems.
  38. (1993). Why Perestroika Failed.
  39. (1997). Zero is not enough: on the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets,

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.