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The role of the Courts sustaining democracy: An approach from transitional regimes

By Vicente F. Benítez R. and Germán A. González H.


This article explores the political factors that enable or prevent the consolidation of an effective judicial review in transitional democracies such as the Colombian and the Venezuelan ones. These democracies, in turn, are likely to be victims of abusive constitutionalism attempts by powerful executives, which is a phenomenon typical of young democracies. This paper analyzes key cases of successful and unsuccessful experiences in Central Europe, Asia and Latin America in order to identify what kind of factors allow or hinder a Tribunal’s effective judicial review in new democracies. I argue that factors as judicial independence, separation of powers, Courts’ reputation, and judicial deference to other branches, are key elements to determine whether a Tribunal will be a successful institution

Topics: Control jurisdiccional, democracia, revisión de la Constitución, Colombia, Venezuela, Hungría, India, derecho comparado, Corte Constitucional, Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence, K1-7720
Publisher: Universidad Externado de Colombia
Year: 2016
OAI identifier: oai:doaj.org/article:68b547312c2b4de2b2b0b6f6138001f8
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