Bohm’s theory of the relationship of mind and matter revisited


In this paper it is claimed that Bohm’s holistic, realistic, causally deterministic, non-local theory of the relationship of mind and matter which is based on the key notion of “active information” suffers from an ill inductive reasoning. It is shown that the notion is a special case of the notion of pragmatic information as posed by Roederer which applies merely to natural living systems and artifacts (unnatural nonliving systems). So, the extension of the thesis of active information to the natural nonliving world would count as a violation of the key constituent concepts of pragmatic information and as an ill generalization of Bohm’s thesis itself. Active information as ‘mind’ will be found in biological systems and in some artifacts which represent the biological mind. There is no reason to think of inanimate nature being driven by information. This, in turn, would lead to the substitution of empirical realism for realism, modifying Bohm’s ideas to come even closer to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics

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University of Queensland eSpace

Last time updated on 04/08/2016

This paper was published in University of Queensland eSpace.

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