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納入延遲策略下的政府環境誘因管制分析

By 翁仁甫 and 梁雅婷

Abstract

鑒於過往關於資訊不對稱下的環境管制分析,皆未將環境管制當局可採取延遲\ud (delay) 策略,做為管制政策工具的可能性納入討論的範圍。本研究擬擴展Boyer and\ud Laffont (1999) 的當事-代理 (principal-agent) 環境管制分析架構,將政府環境管制當局可\ud 以採取延遲策略,做為其環境誘因管制 (environmental incentive regulation) 工具的可能性\ud 納入考慮,建構一個考慮延遲策略的環境誘因管制模型,進行政府環境誘因管制措施的\ud 福利與經濟影響效果分析,The past environmental regulation analyses under asymmetric information often disregard\ud the possibility that environmental regulatory authorities may take the delay strategy as\ud regulatory policy tool. This research will construct a model of environmenta

Topics: Environmental incentive regulation, Delay, Incentive theory, Principal-agent\ud model, 環境誘因管制, 延遲, 誘因理論, 當事-代理模型\ud model
Publisher: 臺中巿:國立中興大學農業經濟研究所
Year: 2014
OAI identifier: oai:ir.lib.nchu.edu.tw:11455/79706

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