This article explores and gives a preliminary answer to the question whether,
from a particular pragmatic pluralist perspective, the notion of truth can have
any bearing on religious propositions in today’s secularised and multicultural
societies. It is argued that the realist and antirealist answers to this question
are not satisfactory. Along the lines of an analysis of Hilary Putnam’s notion of
conceptual truth it is argued that establishing what a true proposition claims,
and whether it is actually true, depends on the intellectual and practical abilities
we have in the particular field in which the proposition is situated. I conclude
that even in a secular or multi-religious society of today, the truth of at
least some religious propositions can be assessed in ways similar to nonreligious
propositions
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