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Why are Federal Central Banks more Activist?

By H.J. Roelfsema

Abstract

This paper analyzes monetary policy making by a committee of regional representatives in a currency union with asymmetric shocks. By considering strategic delegation of monetary policy making, we show that regional representatives in a federal policy making committee may be more activist than the average citizen in their district. Hence, in our model federal central banks such as the ECB and the FED respond more aggressively to output shocks when compared to individual central banks

Topics: Central Banking, Asymmetric Shocks, Federations, Strategic Delegation
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:dspace.library.uu.nl:1874/37100
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