Return to loyalty : New patterns of cooperation in the Swedish labour market regime

Abstract

This study aims at defining the development of the macro/meso level Swedish labourmarket regime during the last decade. This includes the effect of structural changesand what development tendencies exist. For this purpose three questions have beenformulated:1. How can the macro/meso level relations between the labour market organizations of the bargainingrounds since 1997 be described using the concepts exit, voice and loyalty as an interpretation oforganizational choices?2. How can the changing relations between the labour market organizations be explained?3. Based on this, how can the present labour market regime be defined?For this purpose the concept of labour market regimes is used. The interactionbetween actors in this is interpreted through a cooperative game theory coupled withthe concepts exit, voice, loyalty. Exit means the actors leaving the system,corresponding to the negotiation game threats. Voice means negotiation conflictresolution. Loyalty both correspond to coalition patterns and forces keeping theregime in place. Material is informant interviews with key actors and officialdocuments from bargaining and negotiation. The results of the study are that therelations have been stabilized by the IA of 1997, since which the development istowards increased peak-level organizational involvement. Because of labour marketfragmentation this takes the form in confederation coordination between differentparties. To conceptualize this I propose the concept peak-level coordinatedbargaining. In this the coalition development is towards the reemergence of oldloyalty patterns and the inclusion of new actors in this system. To explain this pathdependency due to well established loyalties and actor continuity is suggested