Razlika između pravde i legitimnosti kao osnova za tumačenje Rolsovog Prava naroda

Abstract

Članak predstavlja razmatranje Rolsovog koncepta međunarodnih odnosa i analizira pitanja koja su uzrok spornih tumačenja među liberalnim misliocima. Autor polazi od premise da je razlika između pravde i legitimnosti ključna, te da može da objasni većinu spornih mesta, kao i osnovnu nameru i domete Rolsovog učenja. Takođe, tvrdi se kako razlika između „razložnog“ i „pristojnog“, koja je značajna promena u njegovoj koncepciji prava naroda, predstavlja direktan odgovor na Habermasovu kritiku. Autor zaključuje razmatranjem koncepata realističke utopije i izmirenja sa društvenim svetom, i tvrdi da je Habermasova koncepcija „skromnije“ uloge filozofije u modernom društvu u velikoj meri uticala na nastanak i razvoj Rolsovih novih ideja.This article provides an examination of Rawls‘s account of international relations, and discusses some of the issues that sparked debate about it among liberal authors. The author starts with the premise that the difference between justice and legitimacy can explain much of the contested issues, as well as the intent and scope of Rawls‘s approach. Furthermore, it is argued that the distinction between the reasonable and the decent, that characterizes the changes in Rawls‘s view, was specifically formulated as a response to Habermas. The article concludes with the analysis of the notions of realistic utopia and reconciliation with our social world, and argues that Habermas‘s view of a more modest role for philosophy due to »four moral-political liabilities of our time« greatly influences the genesis and development of some of Rawls‘s new ideas

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