Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Consciousness: explaining the phenomena.

By Peter Carruthers

Abstract

Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system

Topics: Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:cogprints.org:2235
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://cogprints.org/2235/1/Ex... (external link)
  • http://cogprints.org/2235/ (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.