From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Abstract

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.Financial support from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Banco Santander and Generalitat de Catalunya under project 2011LINE-06, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2011-24200 and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project ECO2013-43119 are gratefully acknowledged

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Last time updated on 04/05/2016

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