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Informational aspects of a class of subjective games of incomplete information: Static case

By Demosthenis Teneketzis and D. A. Castanon

Abstract

Subjective games of incomplete information are formulated where some of the key assumptions of Bayesian games of incomplete information are relaxed. The issues arising because of the new formulation are studied in the context of a class of nonzero-sum, two-person games, where each player has a different model of the game. The static game is investigated in this note. It is shown that the properties of the static subjective game are different from those of the corresponding Bayesian game. Counterintuitive outcomes of the game can occur because of the different beliefs of the players. These outcomes may lead the players to realize the differences in their models

Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; Plenum Publishing Corporation ; Springer Science+Business Media
Year: 1987
DOI identifier: 10.1007/BF00939442
OAI identifier: oai:deepblue.lib.umich.edu:2027.42/45229
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