oaioai:edpsciences.org:dkey/10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5

Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents

Abstract

We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics

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oaioai:edpsciences.org:dkey/10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5Last time updated on 4/10/2020

This paper was published in EDP Sciences OAI-PMH repository (1.2.0).

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