<p>How does a parent company organizational dimension affect its joint ventures’ performance in a transitional<br />economy? We explored that question through an analytical inductive case study. Our findings indicate that the<br />confluence of a function-oriented matrix form and lack of formal procedures at the strategic level led to a<br />fief-like organization in which its functional departments hold high power and low accountability while its JVs’<br />management team hold low power but high accountability. Such a fief-like organizational parent makes a<br />negative contribution to its JV performance by adding difficulty to its JV formal control, introducing<br />department-driven opportunism through imposing inside hierarchical goals upon its JV, leading to a low<br />opportunism control efficacy as the result of the separation of opportunism beneficiary from the costs. The<br />negative contribution from the fief-like organization is due to its organizational injustice and a reverse<br />arrangement between authority power and accountability.</p
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