Regulation is often employed to encourage the provision of readily interpretable, explicit<br/>information to betting markets in an effort to promote their efficiency. This approach is<br/>supported by a considerable volume of laboratory-based research which suggests that individuals<br/>make poor judgments in the face of implicit, dynamic information. This article investigates to<br/>what extent horserace bettors, who have strong incentives to make good probability judgments,<br/>require the regulator’s protection from such hostile information environments. In particular, we<br/>examine the accuracy of the subjective probabilities of bettors concerning 16,344 horses in 1671<br/>races. We find that bettors are skilled in adopting effective heuristics to simplify their dynamic<br/>information environment and, even in the face of restricted information, develop well-calibrated<br/>judgments using outcome feedback. A number of factors that help bettors to achieve good<br/>calibration are identified and the implications for market regulation are discussed
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