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Is meaning fraught with ought?

By Daniel Whiting


According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In this paper, I shall not consider that view; instead, I shall address the prior issue of whether or not one should accept Normativism. Against certain recent prominent lines of attack common to a number of different anti-Normativist discussions, I shall defend both the Normativist thesis and an attempt to appeal to a certain platitude in its support

Topics: B1
Year: 2009
OAI identifier:
Provided by: e-Prints Soton

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