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Trace-strength and source-monitoring accounts of accuracy and metacognitive resolution in the misinformation paradigm

By P. A. Higham, K. Luna and J. Bloomfield


Two experiments are reported that investigate the impact of misinformation on memory accuracy and metacognitive resolution. In Experiment 1, participants viewed a series of photographs depicting a crime scene, were exposed to misinformation that contradicted details in the slides, and later took a recognition memory test. For each answer, participants were required to indicate whether they were willing to testify (report) their answer to the Court and to rate confidence. Misinformation impaired memory accuracy but it had no effect on resolution, regardless of whether resolution was indexed with confidence-rating measures (gamma correlation and mean confidence) or a report-option measure (type-2 discrimination: d’). In Experiment 2, a similar accuracy-confidence dissociation was found, and the misinformation effect occurred mostly with fine-grained responses, suggesting that responding was based on recollected details. We argue that the results support source-monitoring accounts of accuracy and resolution rather than accounts based on trace strength

Year: 2011
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Provided by: e-Prints Soton

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