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Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games ∗

By Indrajit Ray and Susan Snyder

Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalised first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium

Topics: Revealed Preference, Consistency, Subgame-Perfect. JEL Classification Numbers, C72, C92
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.417.6571
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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