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Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods”, Social Choice and Welfare 28

By Murat Atlamaz and Bettina Klaus

Abstract

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness

Topics: Hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, transferproofness
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.416.943
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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