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Instructor: Yael Tauman Kalai Bounded Memory Leakage

By Scribe Raluca and Ada Popa


When designing cryptographic schemes, we usually rely on the assumption that every bit of the secret key is secret. However, in practice, loss of secrecy can happen due to side-channel attacks. For example, an adversary can get secret information using timing attacks, acoustic attacks, or even by getting access to parts of the memory used by a cryptographic protocol such as in the “cold-boot attack ” demonstrated by Halderman et al. [HSH + 09]. With some bits of the secret key revealed, security guarantees may no longer hold

Year: 2011
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