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The Basic Approval Voting Game

By Centre National, De La, Recherche Scientifique, Remzi Sanver, Jean-françois Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver

Abstract

We survey results about Approval Voting obtained within the standard framework of game theory. Restricting the set of strategies to undominated and sincere ballots does not help to predict Approval Voting outcomes, which is also the case under strategic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and its usual re…nements. Strong Nash equilibrium in general does not exist but predicts the election of a Condorcet winner when one exists.

Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.413.5645
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