Natural kinds in evolution and systematics: metaphysical and epistemological considerations'. Acta Biotheoretica, 57, 77-97. Brigandt, I. (in press-a), 'Beyond reduction and pluralism: toward an epistemology of explanatory integration in biology'. Erkennt

Abstract

Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible but one or the other approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper broadens the perspective by considering homologues as another example of natural kinds, comparing them with analogues as functionally defined kinds. Given that there are various types of natural kinds, I discuss the different theoretical purposes served by diverse kind concepts, suggesting that there is no clear-cut distinction between natural kinds and other kinds, such as functional kinds. Rather than attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural ’ kind, a more fruitful approach consists in the epistemological study of how different natural kind concepts are employed in scientific reasoning. NATURAL KINDS IN EVOLUTION AND SYSTEMATICS 2 Although most discussions of natural kinds in evolutionary biology and systematics focus on metaphysical issues (e.g., what is a natural kind, or which biological things are kinds), epistemological considerations are at least as important (e.g., what epistemic-theoretical aims ar

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oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.405.1833Last time updated on 10/22/2014

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