Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Computationally Sound Verification of the NSL Protocol via Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker

By Gergei Bana, Pedro Adão and Hideki Sakurada

Abstract

Abstract. In this paper we show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh [7] for computationally sound verification is powerful enough to verify actual protocols, such as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol. In their model, one does not define explicit Dolev-Yao adversarial capabilities but rather the limitations (axioms) of the adversarial capabilities. In this paper we present a set of axioms sufficient to show that no symbolic adversary compliant with these axioms can successfully violate secrecy or authentication in case of the NSL protocol. Hence all implementations for which these axioms are sound – namely, implementations using CCA2 encryption, and satisfying a minimal parsing requirement for pairing – exclude the possibility of successful computational attacks.

Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.359.5510
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/31... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.