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Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 369–393 1555-7561/20060369 Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

By Sushil Bikhchandani

Abstract

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of onedimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals

Topics: multi-dimensional information, interdependent
Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.353.2391
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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