Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository


By Johann Wolfgang, Goethe-universität Frankfurt and Am Main


We analyze the impact of changing personal bankruptcy law in an economy with many principals and agents. Weakening personal bankruptcy law (making default more attractive) leads to a redistribution of debt from poor to rich agents. Due to the weakening of bankruptcy law, poor agents and principals are worse off and rich agents may be better off. “Excess Returns of Companies with a Distinguished Player”, with Matthias Blonski (Goethe-University Frankfurt) What are equilibrium share prices for companies with value increasing shareholders who can exert costly effort and trade shares? If the share price anticipates value increasing effort, value increasing shareholders want to sell their shares and save on the private effort costs. We show that rational Nash equilibria exist where shares are traded below their equilibrium value. This implies excess returns for firms with value increasing shareholders

Topics: Industrial Organization, Corporate Finance, Contract Theory Development Economics, Law and Economics Microeconomics, Finance, Contract and Organization Theory Development Economics, Law and Economics RESEARCH PAPERS “A General Equilibrium Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy Law”
Year: 2013
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.