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Sequential equilibria in bayesian games with communication

By et al. Dino Gerardi

Abstract

Consider a static Bayesian game (Harsanyi 1967-68) and suppose that the players can communicate with one another and with a trustworthy mediator before choosing their actions. Communication gives to the players the opportunity to exchange their information and coordinate their actions. By taking advantage of these opportunities the players ma

Year: 2005
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