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A contract-based model for directed network formation

By Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor and John N. Tsitsiklis

Abstract

We consider a network game where the nodes of the network wish to form a graph to route traffic between themselves. We present a model where costs are incurred for routing traffic, as well as for a lack of network connectivity. We focus on directed links and the link stability equilibrium concept, and characterize connected link stable equilibria. The structure of connected link stable networks is analyzed for several special cases. JEL classification: C62, C72. Key words: Network formation games, traffic routing

Topics: between two categories of formation models. In the first category, the network ∗ Corresponding author
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.331.9766
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