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Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

By Levent Koçkesen, Efe A. Ok and Rajiv Sethi

Abstract

We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payo¤s but also about their payo¤s relative to others) earn strictly higher material payo¤s than do the material payo ¤ maximizers. Included in the class are common pool resource and public good games. If each member of the population interacts with each other member (the playing-the-field model), we show that any evolutionary selection dynamic satisfying a weak payoff monotonicity condition implies that only interdependent preferences can survive in the long run

Topics: Interdependent Preferences, Evolution, Socialization
Year: 1998
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.320.1385
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