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On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs

By Francis Chu Joseph

Abstract

Given a finite two player game with common payoffs (i.e., the players have completely common interests), we show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy whose expected joint payoff is at least (1; 1) is NP-complete. 1 Introduction There is a great deal of overlap between game theory and distributed computing. In particular, both are concerned with dealing with uncertainty in multi-agent systems. However, there are differences as well. In distributed computing we are concerned with, among other things, fault tolerance and scaling effects (what happens as the number of agents in the system gets large). On the other hand, distributed computing tends to ignore strategic concerns, which are perhaps the primary focus of game theory. Issue like utilities (payoffs) are rarely discussed in distributed computing. In this paper, we take a game-theoretic viewpoint to a significant distributed computing problem: Free Flight. In recent years, the Federal Aviation A..

Topics: computational complexity, distributed systems, game theory
Year: 2001
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.32.3417
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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