We develop and test a model of nonprofit executive compensation based on theories of organizational science, economics, and agency theory. Our sample consisted of 114 directors of small business development centers in the United States. Consistent with our model, we find significant effects for human capital, organizational size, and organizational affiliation. We find tentative support for a significant pay-for-performance relationship. We find that when education, tenure, size, performance, and affiliation are held constant, female executives are compensated significantly less than male executives. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION is a topic that has produced a proliferation of academic literature in past decades. The importance of the topic is difficult to overstate, especially given the widespread public perception of executive compensation as excessive, unfair, and difficult to explain. Executive compensation is generally recognized as a key variable in executive motivation, which can have great significance for the activities and direction of the organizatio
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