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Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics

By Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer and Benyamin Shitovitz

Abstract

It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set iff the game is exact

Year: 1994
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.318.2009
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