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Trading Cycles for School Choice

By Marek Pycia and M. Utku Ünver

Abstract

In this note we study the allocation and exchange of discrete resources in environments in which monetary transfers are not allowed. We allow each discrete resource to be represented by several copies, extend onto this environment the trading cycles mechanisms of Pycia and Ünver [2009], and show that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. In particular, we construct the counterpart of Pápai [2000] hiererachical exchange mechanisms for environments with copies

Topics: Mechanism design, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, matching, house allocation, house exchange, outside options
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.308.4020
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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