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Equilibria in a class of games and topological results implying their existence

By Robert Samuel Simon, Stanisław Spież and Henryk Torunczyk

Abstract

We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers

Topics: QA Mathematics
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2008
DOI identifier: 10.1007/BF03191816
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:41654
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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