Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Miller's models and their applicability to nations

By Luke Ulaş

Abstract

This paper argues that the two models of collective responsibility David Miller presents in National Responsibility and Global Justice do not apply to nations. I first consider the 'like-minded group' model, paying attention to three scenarios in which Miller employs it. I argue that the feasibility of the model decreases as we expand outwards from the smallest group to the largest, since it increasingly fails to capture all members of the group adequately, and the locus of any like-mindedness becomes too abstract and vague to have the causal force the model requires. I thereafter focus on the 'cooperative practice' model, examining various ways in which the analogy Miller draws between an employee-led business and a nation breaks down. In concluding I address the concern that my arguments have worrying consequences and suggest that, on the contrary, the rejection of the idea of national responsibility is a positive move

Topics: JC Political theory
Publisher: Berghahn Journals Published in association with the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.3167/th.2011.5812906
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:41530
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://journals.berghahnbooks.... (external link)
  • http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41530... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.