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Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

By Olivier Gossner

Abstract

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player

Topics: HB Economic Theory, QA Mathematics
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The Econometric Society
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.3982/ECTA9385
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:38927
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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