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On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

By Jordi Massó and Inés Moreno de Barreda

Abstract

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints

Topics: H Social Sciences (General), HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:37736
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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