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Unbundling ownership and control

By Daniel Ferreira, Emanuel Ornelas and John L. Turner

Abstract

We study optimal corporate control allocations under asymmetric information. We modify the canonical partnership dissolution model to allow for the endogenous determination of ex post ownership and control structures. Using a mechanism design approach, we fully characterize the optimal restructuring mechanism. This mechanism requires increasing the number of shares of the incumbent insider if he remains in control, while giving him a golden parachute that may include both stock and cash if he is deposed. The model exemplifies a novel explanation for the prevalence and persistence of the separation of ownership from control: efficiency in control contests is more easily achieved when ownership of cash flow rights is not concentrated in the hands of insiders. The model generates several novel empirical predictions

Topics: HD61 Risk Management, HG Finance
Publisher: European Corporate Governance Institute
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:37556
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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