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Concepts or metacognition – what is the issue: commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “the concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness”

By Kristina Musholt

Abstract

The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so much conceptual but rather metacognitive abilities

Topics: B Philosophy (General)
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2012
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.05.002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:36920
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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