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A non-tariff protectionist bias in majoritarian politics: government subsidies and electoral institutions

By Stephanie J. Rickard

Abstract

Governments elected by majoritarian rules are, according to conventional wisdom, more protectionist than governments elected by proportional rules. However, existing tests of this claim examine only one possible form of trade protection: tariffs. This leaves open the possibility that governments in majoritarian systems provide no more protection than governments in proportional systems but simply use tariffs more often than other forms of trade protection. Does the protectionist bias in majoritarian politics extend beyond tariffs? The current study addresses this question by examining an increasingly important form of trade protection: subsidies. In a sample of 68 countries from 1990 to 2006, spending on subsidies is found to be higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems, holding all else equal. The implication is that the protectionist bias in majoritarian systems does in fact extend beyond tariffs

Topics: H Social Sciences (General), HC Economic History and Conditions, HJ Public Finance, JF Political institutions (General)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Year: 2012
DOI identifier: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00760.x
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:36149
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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