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Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

By Franz Dietrich

Abstract

The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent

Topics: BC Logic
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2004
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:35827
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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