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General representation of epistemically optimal procedures

By Franz Dietrich

Abstract

Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log likelihood ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (“Epistemic Monotonicity”) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative; it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a profile of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known here

Topics: BC Logic
Publisher: Springer Nature
Year: 2006
DOI identifier: 10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:35826
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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