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The premises of Condorcet’s jury theorem are not simultaneously justified

By Franz Dietrich

Abstract

Condorcet’s famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of probability considered and (ii) none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justified. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened

Topics: BC Logic
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Year: 2008
DOI identifier: 10.1353/epi.0.0023
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:35824
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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