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Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change

By David C. Makinson


We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on the qualitative part of probabilistic inference leads to a very broad class of 'proto-probability' functions

Topics: B Philosophy (General)
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.1007/s10992-011-9176-4
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Provided by: LSE Research Online

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