Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Accountability as a bureaucratic minefield: lessons from a comparative study

By Edward C. Page


The large and growing literature on accountability highlights a variety of mechanisms by which bureaucrats may be held accountable as regards their role in the policy-making process. This paper looks at accountability mechanisms from the bureaucrat's perspective using material gathered for a study of bureaucratic roles in rulemaking in Sweden, Germany, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union. It asks to which of the mechanisms for securing public accountability for executive decisions do bureaucrats pay particular attention when helping develop policy: where are the minefields they feel they have to negotiate? The most important of the minefields is political executive approval. It shapes the way the other mechanisms (group opinion, the legislative and judicial branches of government) are negotiated. Thus 'ministerial responsibility' and its equivalents in the other countries remain crucial features of systems of administrative accountability

Topics: JA Political science (General)
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Year: 2010
DOI identifier: 10.1080/01402382.2010.486125
OAI identifier:
Provided by: LSE Research Online
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • (external link)
  • (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.