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On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates

By M. I. Shehata

Abstract

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperation is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators

Topics: Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:arXiv.org:1103.5150
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