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Why are buyouts levered?: the financial structure of private equity funds

By Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg and Michael S. Weisbach

Abstract

Private equity funds are important to the economy, yet there is little analysis explaining their financial structure. In our model the financial structure minimizes agency conflicts between fund managers and investors. Relative to financing each deal separately, raising a fund where the manager receives a fraction of aggregate excess returns reduces incentives to make bad investments. Efficiency is further improved by requiring funds to also use deal-by-deal debt financing, which becomes unavailable in states where internal discipline fails. Private equity investment becomes highly sensitive to aggregate credit conditions and investments in bad states outperform investments in good states

Topics: HG Finance
Publisher: Wiley
Year: 2009
DOI identifier: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01473.x
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:32157
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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