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Security of ECQV-Certified ECDSA Against Passive Adversaries

By Daniel R. L. Brown, Matthew J. Campagna and Scott A. Vanstone

Abstract

We show that the elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone implicit certificate scheme (ECQV), when composed with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), is secure against passive adversaries under the combined assumption of the random oracle model and the generic group model. In contrast, we detail an attack on the composition of another implicit certificate scheme, proposed by Pintsov and Vanstone for Optimal Mail Certificates (OMC), and ECDSA. This composition attack forges an implicitly certified ECDSA signature, and is passive in the sense of needing no interaction with the signer or the certification authority. (Pintsov and Vanstone did not propose combining OMC with ECDSA.)

Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.215.5457
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