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Epistemic aspects of representative government

By Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann

Abstract

The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy and trustee-style representative democracy

Topics: B Philosophy (General), H Social Sciences (General)
Publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:30687
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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